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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY

alimony. Section 236 was applied in Brownstein v. Brownstein147
to allow alimony even though separation was denied because the
husband and wife were living apart by mutual consent. Accordingly, section 236 has had a liberalizing influence on the Family
Court. In Steinberg v. Steinberg, 48 the Court of Appeals stated
that the change in public policy as enunciated in section 236
was projected also into the Family Court. It was held that
Section 236 of the Domestic Relations Law similarly authorized
the Family Court to award support on a "means" basis under
Section 412 of the Family Court Act even though the parties
were voluntarily living apart.
Steinberg, it is submitted, is the precurser of changing law in
the Family Court that will be indirectly effected by the liberal
provisions of the Domestic Relations Law.
DRL § 240:

Failure to obey child support order not punishable
by contempt.

Under Section 240 of the Domestic Relations Law a court may,
in a habeas corpus proceeding brought to obtain custody or visitation
1 49
rights, order a parent to provide for the support of his child.

However, in Feit v. Feit,"50 the supreme court dismissed a wife's
petition to punish her husband for contempt for failing to make
child support payments ordered in such a proceeding.
Section 245 of the Domestic Relations Law makes child
support orders issued in matrimonial actions enforceable by contempt. Although it felt that it was merely a legislative oversight
that a similar provision was not made for such orders issued in
habeas corpus proceedings, the court was reluctant to hold the
husband in contempt. 15
Until section 245 could be amended, it was suggested that
CPLR 7006 be used to enforce orders arising out of habeas corpus
proceedings." 2 However, it appears that CPLR 7006 can be
used only to compel production of the "corpus" and not compliance

App. Div. 2d 205, 263 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1st Dep't 1966).
N.Y.2d 492, 223 N.E.2d 553, 277 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1966).
149 It should be noted that before the enactment of Domestic Relations
Law §§237(b), 240, no award of support was available for a child in a
habeas corpus proceeding. See 7B McKiNNE's CPLR 203, commentary
14725
148 18

361-64 (1964).
-052 Misc. 2d 829, 276 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1967).
'' Id. at 829-30, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 669.

152Ibid.
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with orders issued after such production. 15 3 Thus, this decision,
by denying enforcement under section 245, effectively frustrates
the provision of section 240 permitting child support orders in
habeas corpus proceedings.
NEW YORK

CCA

CITY CIVIL COURT ACT

§ 201: No jurisdiction to award money judgment for
fraudulent conveyance.

While the Civil Court of the City of New York is given
jurisdiction over actions for the recovery of money where the
amount sought to be recovered does not exceed $10,0001

54

it has

no general equity jurisdiction. 55 This limit upon jurisdiction
is closely adhered to by the court. 6
A recent example of the stringency of the jurisdictional limitation is Circulation Associates, Inc. v. Mother's Manual, Inc."5
There, plaintiff alleged that a transfer to the defendant by the
judgment debtor of its customer lists and contracts was fraudulent
under Article 10 of the Debtor and Creditor Law, since it was
made while the judgment debtor was insolvent. Plaintiff sought
a money judgment in lieu of a decree setting aside the conveyance.
153 CPLR 7006(a) provides that the "person upon whom the writ . . .
is served . . . shall make a return to [the court which issued the writ] ...
and, if required by [the court] . . . produce the body of the person
detained. . . ." This language suggests that only initial compliance with

the writ, i.e., production, is contemplated. This conclusion is supported
by referring to cases under the predecessor of the present section, CPA
§1248. See, e.g., In re Sedgwick, 211 App. Div. 60, 206 N.Y.S. 850
(1st Dep't 1924); Application of Hebo, 95 N.Y.S.2d 545 (Sup. Ct N.Y.
County 1950); People ex rel. Kniffin v. Knight, 184 Misc. 545, 56 N.Y.S.2d

108 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1945).
154 CCA § 202 provides that "the court shall have jurisdiction of actions

and proceedings for the recovery of money, actions and proceedings for
the recovery of chattels and actions and proceedings for the foreclosure
of liens on personal property where the amount sought to be recovered
See generally
or the value of the property does not exceed $10,000."
WACHTELL, Nmv Yonx PRACriCE UNDER THE CPLR 8-10 (2d ed. 1966).
155 N.Y. COxsT. art. VI, § 15(b); CCA §§ 202-05; Petrides v. Park Hill
Restaurant, 265 App. Div. 509, 39 N.Y.S.2d 645 (1st Dep't 1943); Kwoczka

v. Dry Dock Say. Bank, 52 Misc. 2d 67, 275 N.Y.S.2d 156 (N.Y.C. Civ.
Ct. 1966).
156

See, e.g., Kwoczka v. Dry Dock Say. Bank, 52 Misc. 2d 67, 275

N.Y.S.2d 156 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1966), where the court was requested to
return a sum of money to
by her late husband. The
because to do so it would
action.
157 53 Misc. 2d 225, 278

plaintiff's account from a Totten Trust created
court stated that it could not return the money
have to cancel the trust, an essentially equitable
N.Y.S.2d 137 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1967).

